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The United States and Britain get tougher with Yemen’s Houthis after months of the Iran backed militia attacking ships in the Red Sea. A former U. S. Intelligence official gives us his view of the latest british threat of direct action against the it was direct, quite clear, and probably meant to be a last and significant warning to Hoosi leadership that western restraint had reached its end. A long running cyber war between Iran and Israel is intensifying. We’ll examine the latest incidents with it. Security company checkpoint and residents of Iran’s biggest cities are enduring severe air pollution this winter, as we’ll hear from a Britain based environmental journalist. Now the smog is so bad that they can feel it, they can taste it, and they can see it inside their houses. From the voice of America, this is flashpoint Iran. Good morning. I’m Michael Lippin in Washington. For the first time since houthi forces started their latest wave of attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in October, U. S. Forces protecting those ships engaged in a deadly confrontation with the Houthis. On Sunday, the US Central command said navy helicopters responding to an attack by Houthis on the vessel Merskung Zhou returned fire on the Houthis in self defense and sank three of their boats, killing all militiamen on board, the Houthis said. Ten were killed. Later, the british navy said the Merse Kong Zhou and its crew were safe and continuing their journey. British Defense Secretary Grant Shaps, writing in the Daily Telegraph on Monday, said London is willing to take direct action to deter houthi threats to freedom of navigation. Norman Ruhl is a former U. S. National intelligence manager for Iran. I asked him by phone on Tuesday what he thinks of the latest western responses to Houthi attacks. The US and the UK continue to execute a proportional response to houthi aggression that is shaped by the houthi actions themselves. If the Houthi attack involves drones and missiles, our forces respond by shooting down the weapons but avoid attacks on Houthi sites because Washington and London apparently believe doing so will escalate regional tensions and could expand a regional conflict. The sinking of Houthi boats, however, was a response to a direct attack that involved Houthi personnel using lethal force and thus justified a similar defense action. The statement by the british defense minister was direct, quite clear, and probably meant to be a last and significant warning to houthi leadership that western restraint had reached its end, and that the likely western response to further houthi actions that involve lethal force would be a wide ranging attack against houthi military and perhaps command and control locations in Yemen. How much do you think that message is getting through to the Houthis? There’s no reason to believe the Houthis aren’t closely following western messaging and western media on this issue. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that the Houthis and the Iranians don’t measure their actions based on any one statement by the US or its partners, or by any one action by the US and its partners. Instead, they base it on their perception of our overall intent and our fortitude on an issue. So deterrence is often something you achieve only in a temporary way or in a specific location, until the adversary believes you have grown tired, or you’re looking away, or your domestic political situation won’t allow you to continue to focus on them. And then they feel opportunity then arises for them to become more aggressive. There have been some other interesting moves on the part of the US and Iran in the region in the last couple of days. The US saying it’s going to withdraw its Gerald Ford aircraft carrier from the eastern Mediterranean. And at the same time you have Iran sending its Albors warship into the Red Sea. What do you think these developments signify in terms of the US and iranian strategies here? The Gerald L. Ford aircraft carrier returns home after about eight months at sea. That is a long deployment, and that deployment was extended three times by the secretary of defense. But the US retains extensive firepower in the region. The Dwight Eisenhower aircraft carrier task force remains to respond to Red Sea issues, and its missiles and aircraft would not have great difficulty responding to events, say, in Lebanon. In the Mediterranean, the US retains a number of naval assets that carry missile anti aircraft capabilities and fighter aircraft. So the departure of the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier and some of its associated ships does reduce us air power. But that which remains is more than capable of overcoming regional adversary. Now, the arrival of the Iranian el Boar’s frigate is more of a message than a threat. Built in the United Kingdom in 1968 and last refitted in the United Kingdom in 1977, the ship carries a small complement of antiship and air defense weapons. It would be quickly and easily defeated by any of the US or United Kingdom naval assets in any actual battle. But as to the mission of the Al Boers and its significance in terms of its presence, there are three likely explanations. First, Iran does maintain a small counter piracy presence in the Red Sea, and the Al Boers has done such duty in the past, although I believe it’s been some time since it’s returned. Next, and most likely the Iranians maintain a naval intelligence collection platform in the Red Sea. It’s a cargo ship called the Bashad, and it collects signals intelligence and observational intelligence on maritime activity. The Bashad is believed to be collecting intelligence on maritime targets that it then passes to the Houthis for action. Given the houthi attacks on Israel, Tehran probably wants to give the Bashad additional protection. Last, the Albors may not represent a threat, but its presence does send a message that Iran will protect its equities in the Red Sea. That message is meant for regional actors, domestic partners, and to a lesser extent, the west. Unless the El Boers threatens the US or western vessels, we will likely take no action against it. And even though the El Boers would be very quickly defeated in any naval action with the west, that confrontation could risk further iranian retaliation that would ignite a regional conflict. So I don’t see anyone looking to pick a fight with the elbores. Well, speaking of regional conflict, it does seem like another front is heating up with airstrikes on iranian backed militias along the iraqi syrian border that the US has not claimed responsibility for. And the suspicion is falling on Israel as having conducted such strikes. And you also have those same iranian backed militias in the Iraq eastern Syria region firing drones at Israel that Israel is shooting down. What do you think is going on in terms of that aspect of this conflict? So if Israel has conducted a strike on iraqi militants, it wouldn’t be a surprise. Israel has the right and a capacity to respond to iraqi drone attacks, both in retaliation for attacks on its civilian population and to set deterrence. The attack sent a message that Israel won’t stand by while iraqi militants attack its again civilians. The strike appeared proportional and indicates that whereas Israel will defend itself and is interested in resetting deterrence, it isn’t interested in sparking a wider regional conflict. The problem with this attack, and indeed us responses to past iraqi militant strikes on us personnel and locations in Iraq and Syria, is that they don’t yet appear to be sufficient to reset deterrence. Iran will fight to the last proxy, so it will continue to To encourage its proxies to strike against the US and Israel. And the proxies themselves do not appear yet to have suffered sufficient punishment that they believe their local equities. And remember, proxies are most concerned about their local geography, that their local equities have been threatened, and that they need to end these strikes. Well, Norman Ruhl, former U. S. National intelligence manager for Iran and a senior advisor to united against nuclear Iran, speaking to us from northern Virginia. Great to have you back on Flashpoint, Iran. My pleasure. As Israel battles Iran’s proxies on multiple fronts, the two nations also are reporting an escalation of attacks on their infrastructure, with each side accusing the other of responsibility. Iran’s oil minister, Javad Oji, said a cyberattack on his nation’s gas stations on December 18 put about 70% of them out of action for the day. Hackers calling themselves predatory Sparrow claimed responsibility on social media, saying they were retaliating for the aggression of Iran and its regional proxies. Iranian state media labeled the group as israeli. The israeli government had no comment. US israeli it security company checkpoint Software says the December 18 cyberattack was the biggest so far on Iran’s gas stations by predatory Sparrow, which also has taken credit for hacking industrial and transportation sites in Iran in recent years. Gil messing is checkpoint’s chief of staff. I asked him by phone what the hackers are trying to achieve. If you analyze the attacks that have happened in Iran, I think the main issue here, which is also very persistent in cyber attacks worldwide, is that they were trying to send a message. Sometimes the message was to the regime or a specific part of the regime. At many times, it was for the general public, so that they would see the cost of the actions of their government. Even the recent one that targeted the gas stations is happening in a context of attacking of ships in the gulf all the way to Israel. And there you can see there’s a direct link, because the group behind this attack, using the Twitter account and a telegram account, basically said the iranian regime is playing with fire. So they picked a gas station in specific. And also remember that on most of the attacks we’ve discussed here, there was also public claiming or responsibility, which is also not very common in cyberattacks. So the person behind it, or the nation behind it really wanted to convey a message. Well, you mentioned the perpetrators of the gas station attack. They’re online and they call themselves predatory Sparrow, but we don’t really know who they are. And I’m wondering why. It’s really difficult to determine the identities of these people, even when their agenda seems to be pretty clear. They’re talking about criticizing what Iran is doing with its proxies against Israel. So it seems to be a pro Israel agenda that they have. So the cyber world in general, and especially when it comes to nation state actors like this, one whole idea behind this is that it’s very hard to track the person behind the attack, as opposed to the physical world, where you can always link an attack, a missile or anything to a person or organization that’s behind it. In the cyber world, you really can’t. Now, there are many, many claims within Iran and within other places about who they think it is, but they don’t know for sure. And the reason is because nowadays, even state sponsored or nation state cyber tools are being proliferated over the darknet on the Internet so widely. So even if there’s a tool that is very, very synonym or known to be used by a certain government, now it’s been used by other governments as well. So I think that Iran has a pretty good assumption who that is. But remember, we’re talking about a country, as you know very well, that has many enemies throughout the world, and there’s more than one person, organization or a nation which could stand behind such an attack. Well, Iran also appears to have been the source of some attacks on its enemies. There have been cases in Israel of cyber attacks on israeli institutions by hackers who profess to have a pro Iran or even pro palestinian agenda. How effective would you say those have been when you compare them to the attacks that Iran has experienced recently? So if you look at the last five weeks, you could say that there’s an all out cyber war between Israel and Iran, mostly on Israel soil. We have identified more than ten groups that we believe are affiliated with either Iran or Kizbalad or proxy in Lebanon that are very, very heavily engaged in massive cyberattacks against multiple infrastructures and organizations in Israel, from universities to web hosting companies, from government to public and private sector companies. They’ve been trying to attack and have been successful in creating some dozens of attacks in Israel in the past month, which is a clear escalation of the attacks that they’ve been behind in the last, let’s say, three to four years. But they haven’t shut down israeli gas stations. They don’t have these capabilities. And I think also, especially in war, the guards here are very, very up. Remember, to take down a critical infrastructure of a nation, there are several bars you need to pass. And it’s not just an amount of sophistication. It’s very strong malwares and very strong capabilities to take throughout an attack, because the attack can be spotted in different forms and in different ways. What the iranian hacking campaign did in Israel so far, they have been searching for places which has a lot of data or a lot of information about citizens, but not necessarily so guarded. And their biggest success were in organizations that did have high profile in terms of the data or the importance, but did not have very good cyber defenses. But again, if you look at quantity wise, not just quality wise, you can see much more attacks that are taking place now than before. Israel and Iran have been engaged in cyber war for years, but in the last five weeks, you can see a real escalation in the context in the war in Gaza. While Iran is not physically involved in the war itself here on the cybersphere, you can really see their footsteps everywhere in Israel. What is your prediction for how this cyber war between Israel and Iran might develop in the coming weeks and months? So Israel and Iran, unfortunately, are engaged in different kinds of fronts. And I think that the cyber front so far has been the most prominent one in terms of attacks from Iran. It’s not, Iran is not trying to attack Israel in other spheres. It’s less successful doing so than they are on other levels. So on the physical world, they’re using different proxies all over the Middle east, but the israeli military is pretty successful in preventing them on the cyberspace, a bit different. And this is why I think that they will continue to invest resources in attacking Israel on the cybersphere, and they might be more successful in doing so with ransomwares, with wipers, with things that create damages. On the positive note, I think that so far and in the foreseeable future, the damage they can create, while significant, is not compared to the damage they can create on the physical world with a missile strike or something of this sort. So I think it’s comfortable for them on some aspects to attack Israel themselves on the cybersphere, but remaining in levels of damage which is not necessarily that high, that will create an all out war between the two nations. Well, Gil Messing, chief of staff at checkpoint software Technologies, joining us on the line from Tel Aviv. Thanks for sharing your perspective, and great to have you on flashpoint Iran. Thank you, Michael. You’re listening to VOA’s flashpoint Iran. I’m Michael Lippin. Air pollution in Iran’s capital, Tehran, reached dangerous levels last month as cold air prevented smog from rising, a typical phenomenon in winter. London based least independent environmental journalist Sana Mahozi has been tracking the problem. I asked her by phone on December 22 how the latest air pollution levels compare to what she has seen before. There’s data that indicates on time Tells us each year how bad air pollution has been this year, as you said, than the reporting that I’ve done and the news that I get from inside of Iran. Air pollution in Tehran has been very bad to the point that some people have been seeing the smog inside their houses and they can’t see each other on the street. Yeah. Could I just ask a follow up on that question? I’ve never heard of people seeing smog inside their homes. What exactly have people said? How does that feel when that happens? So I’ve been reading up and I’m speaking to a couple of people from inside Tehran that they said that before. So previous years, the smog was contained to outside, and when they were indoors, it was kind of safer. And that’s why schools were closed and offices were closed and people just tended to stay inside. But now the smog is so bad that they can feel it, they can taste it, and they can see it inside their houses. And when they go outside, basically, they can’t see each other on the street. It’s so sick. Wow, that sounds really bad. So how are these people coping? Well, how they’re coping is very tough. Every year, a lot of people in Tehran get admitted to hospital. A lot of people can’t go to work. A lot of schools get closed down. There’s a lot of things that happens to people because of air pollution. They get respiratory issues, their eyes burn. But what else can they do? They have to go on. They wear masks, usually very protective masks that the people that have to be on the streets, that’s how they protect themselves with eyedrops and masks and things like that. There’s nothing much more that they can do other than staying inside. Well, an iranian official did say recently that something like 26,000 people have been killed by air pollution in the country since last year. How does that compare with information that you have about fatalities from this phenomenon? This number seems a little low to me, to be honest, because my reporting and research shows that an average annual number of deaths by air pollution is something around 40,000. So this is based on a study done by the Air Pollution Research center at the Tehran University of Medical Science. And their numbers showed that the annual deaths caused by air pollution, air pollution linked illnesses such as respiratory infection, heart attacks and lung cancer, something around 40,000 per year. Well, when we look at the causes of this problem, there’s been some talk in iranian state media of the burning of diesel fuel in power stations. So maybe you could explain to our listeners why exactly is that done and is anything being done about it? So one of the huge factors causing this air pollution, as you said, is that, but it’s also the burning of Mazolt, which is a low quality fuel in factories that has been one of the leading causes of air pollution. This fuel emits toxic gases such as sulfur dioxide, and can contribute to illnesses and premature death. The reason that this is done is basically that the cleaner options either are not available or not preferred because of price. Last year, this happened because natural gas wasn’t available. They were selling it to other countries due to the war in Ukraine, and that’s why they were using very low quality fuel inside the country. The main issue is political know, they don’t want to change the fuel, basically. So you just made a reference to a fuel called Mazot. Can you tell us what exactly that is? It’s a low quality fuel that is no longer used in so many countries. So it’s basically banned. It’s one of the lowest quality fuels out there that emits very toxic gases, as I said, like sulfur dioxide and others that contribute largely to illness and premature death. And if you look at the news that is coming out of Iran this year and previous year, one of the main causes of air pollution has been contributed to the burning of Mazot. One thing I wanted to say about this is that authorities are denying the use of Mazot. But one of the papers inside Iran, Shar Daily, actually reported that around a dozen steam power plants are burning Mazd. And it’s kind of like 65% of the fuel is coming from this low quality fuel, actually. How would you say the air pollution problem is affecting the iranian economy overall? So this is a good question. The World bank estimates that the economic costs associated with air pollution in Iran is something around $2.6 billion per year. In addition to that, the authorities routinely close down businesses, schools and offices to bring the air pollution down, to bring the number of cars on the street down. And this also causes a huge amount of cost for the economy and people. So if you talk to individual people, sometimes they have to stay home because they’re ill. Sometimes they have to stay home because of the smog. So even if you talk to people individually, this has cost them a lot of money because they can’t go to work, they can’t go to school, they can’t basically carry on with their daily lives. So what is the outlook for air pollution in Iran? Given that the iranian environment department chief, Ali Salah Jeghe, recently said that he thinks the air pollution problem is going to be gone in Tehran within a like how realistic do you think that is? Well, he didn’t offer any concrete plan for, you know, the reports coming from that statement that he made is that there was no sort of concrete plan. There was no measurements to show how that is going to happen. The factories and the power plants are still using very low quality fuel. I mean, for me, honestly, unless there’s some sort of concrete plan, things like government funding, things like the reduction of vehicles on the street or using cleaner fuels to start with, unless these kind of measurements are offered in a plan, then I think this prediction is just wishful thinking. Well, Sanam Mahuzi, independent environmental journalist speaking to us on the line from London. Nice of you to witness on Flashpoint Iran. Thank you for having me. That’s all for the show. I’m Michael Lippin. Thank you for listening. I’ll have another flashpoint Iran for you next week.
